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Contextual objectivity : a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Philippe Grangier
Laboratoire Charles Fabry, Institut d’Optique The´orique et Applique´e, F-91403 Orsay, France
An attempt is made to formulate quantummechanics (QM)
in physical rather than in mathematical terms. It is argued
that the appropriate conceptual framework for QM is “con-
textual objectivity”, which includes an objective definition of
the quantum state. This point of view sheds new light on
topics such as the reduction postulate and the quantum mea-
surement process.
I. INTRODUCTION
We attempt here to define a physical conceptual frame-
work adapted to the interpretation of the usual formal-
ism of quantum mechanics. We do not make any changes
to the mathematics of this formalism, neither do we in-
troduce new equations. Our aim is rather to present
a physical interpretation of the formalism in such a way
that the so-called “difficulties” of QM, such as the reduc-
tion postulate, or the measurement process, can be seen
from another side. Our approach is different from the
one using “consistent (or decoherent) histories”; it care-
fully avoids “multiple worlds”, and it has nothing to do
with any revival of “hidden variable theories”. It should
be better to consider it as a “neo-copenhagian” point of
view, in the sense that it formalizes a distinction between
the classical and quantum worlds. However, contrary to
the copenhagian dogma, a central point in our approach
will be to give an “objective reality” to the quantum state
of a physical system, in a sense which is developed below.
II. A PHYSICAL DEFINITION OF THE
QUANTUM STATE
In their celebrated paper written in 1935, Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen made the following statement [1]:
“If without in any way disturbing a system we can pre-
dict with certainty (i.e., with a probability equal to unity)
the values of a set of physical quantities, then objective
reality can be attached to this set of physical quantities”.
It is known that this rather “metaphysical” definition re-
sulted in a lot of questioning and arguing. However, this
will be our starting point. We will slightly modify this
statement in order to give our definition of the quantum
state1 as follows.
1Throughout this paper “state” means “pure state”. Mixed
states, when needed, will be called “statistical mixtures” [2].
The quantum state of a physical system is de-
fined by the values of a set of physical quanti-
ties, which can be predicted with certainty and
measured repeatedly without perturbing in any
way the system. This set of quantities must be
complete in the sense that the value of any other
quantity which satisfies the same criteria is a
function of these values.
We will first make some comments about this defini-
tion, then draw some consequences from it
Comment 1 : The definition is clearly in agreement
with the usual formalism of QM, as it can be seen when
using the notion of “complete set of commuting observ-
ables” (CSCO) [2]. A quantum state is specified by the
ensemble of eigenvalues corresponding to a CSCO, which
can obviously be measured repeatedly without perturb-
ing in any way the system. Actually, any physical quan-
tity that satisfies the definition can be expressed as a
function of the CSCO observables. This “completeness”
condition is essential to warrant a unique correspondence
between the state and the set [3].
Comment 2 : Since we consider the usual QM for-
malism as said above, the quantum state is mathemat-
ically described by a vector in an Hilbert space, and it
evolves in time according to Schroedinger’s equation. It
it clear that unitary evolution from Schroedinger’s equa-
tion transforms a state which satisfies our definition into
a similar state, associated with a different set of physical
quantities, corresponding to new well-defined measure-
ments (that may however be not easy to perform).
Comment 3 : As an example, a coherent state |α〉 of
the harmonic oscillator can be in a deterministic way dis-
placed by (−α) [2]. After that operation, a measurement
of the photon number nˆ gives n = 0 with probability one.
A similar reasoning applies to an evolving gaussian wave
packet: if we catch it in an appropriate harmonic poten-
tial, and we measure the energy, we find the ground state
energy with probability one. Generally speaking, our def-
inition simply uses the fact that a pure state is always a
joint eigenstate of a set of commuting operators.
Comment 4 : An obvious but fundamental point is that
given a quantum state, not all possible physical quanti-
ties can be predicted with certainty, but only a subset of
them. That the subset is the largest possible set of in-
dependant quantities is just the definition of a CSCO. In
the definition, this appears in the statement “measured
repeatedly without perturbing in any way the system” :
if the subset is not a CSCO, a measurement will generally
change the state. How to deal with physical observables
which do not commute with those of the CSCO is a cru-
cial point, which will be discussed in section III.
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Comment 5 : In order to appreciate the difference be-
tween our definition and the EPR reasoning, one should
consider what “can be predicted with certainty” in a two-
particle EPR state, such as a singlet state. In [1] EPR
were considering measurements on separated subsystems,
where the conditional probability of a measurement result
on one particle, given a measurement done on the other
particle, may take the value one. However, the overall re-
sult of both measurements remains inherently uncertain,
simply because measurements on separated subsystems
are not part of the CSCO defining the EPR state (see
also section III). What actually gives a certain and re-
producible result is a joint “Bell measurement” on the
pair of particles [4]. An EPR state thus perfectly fits
within our definition. Moreover, we may define quantum
non-separability as the impossibility to define the quan-
tum state (according to the definition given above) for
a sub-part of a system which is globally in a spatially
extended entangled state.
Consequence 1 : Though this may sound metaphys-
ical, our definition implies that some “objectivity” can
be attached to the quantum state, in a sense which is re-
markably close to the one used by Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen. In particular, a quantum state as defined above is
clearly independent of the observer. Also, it is well known
from statistical physics or quantum information theory
that a pure state has zero entropy. This clearly fits with
a set of perfectly predictable and observer-independent
properties.
Consequence 2 : Our definition can be given a mean-
ing only by assuming that the sentence “predicted with
certainty and measured repeatedly” itself has a meaning,
i.e., that we are in a context where this predicate corre-
sponds to a well defined action (i.e. a possible experi-
ment). This is why we call our point of view “contextual
objectivity”: the quantum state does have an objective
existence, but its definition is inferred from observa-
tions which are made at the macroscopic level. We
point out that there is no need to refer to “observer’s
consciousness” or anything like that: all what we need is
simply the the usual classical world, as the place where
the measurements are made, and where their results can
be recorded by any (conscious or unconscious) observer.
Consequence 3 : According to the above observations,
the state of the system is conditioned by the external
classical world, which, from now on, we will call the “en-
vironment”. Therefore, we can use an inference principle:
from an appropriate observation in the environment, one
can infer the quantum state of a system. This point is
crucial in what follows, because it is for instance in con-
tradistinction with a “multiple world” point of view: in
our approach, there is only one environment, and the “re-
ality” does not only develop upwards by “ramification”
of the quantum state, but also downwards by inferring
microscopic states from macroscopic observations.
Consequence 4 : A fundamental consequence of all the
above is that what we call the quantum state cannot
involve different “statuses” of the environment. Differ-
ent statuses of the environment can occur only if they
are associated with different quantum states. This may
include the case where the status of the environment is
not known, and is described by using classical statistics.
This corresponds to the usual “statistical mixtures” in
the density matrix formalism. It should be pointed out
that a statistical mixture, contrary to a pure state, is
“contingent” (i.e. observer-dependant). In other terms,
a statistical mixture is always associated to a (classical)
missing information, which may be known by somebody
else. On the other hand, nobody can know more about
a pure state, than what is given in its definition [5].
We will argue below that within the framework de-
fined above, there is no need to add a “measurement
postulate”: this postulate is already implied by the very
definition of the quantum state.
III. MEASUREMENTS ON A QUANTUM
SYSTEM
We now come to the measurement of a physical quan-
tity which does not pertain to the set allowed by the def-
inition of the state (i.e. the CSCO), and therefore which
cannot be predicted with certainty. In a first approach,
we will adopt the usual “decoherence” point of view [4],
which is basically an attempt to calculate what is going
on during the measurement, using the initial quantum
state and Schroedinger’s equation. Then we will criticize
this approach and introduce our point of view.
In the decoherence approach, the initial steps of the
measurement of a physical quantity for a system S1 can
be described by using Schroedinger’s equation, as the in-
teraction of two (or several) systems S1, S2, ... . As a re-
sult of this interaction, S1 is generally no longer in a well
defined state, i.e. no physical quantity relevant to S1 only
is predictable with certainty. The set of fully predictable
physical quantities, which still exists by definition of the
state, will rather correspond to joint measurements of S1
and all the other systems it has interacted with.
Remaining within the decoherence approach, the evo-
lution of the “growing” system will at some point involve
different possible values of environment variables, such
as the position of a needle. Then several things happens.
First, the ”fully predictable quantities” which are still
attached to the global state become useless in practice,
because the corresponding joint measurements become
unpracticable. Second, the calculation can be pushed
further by concentrating on the system itself. This leads
eventually to different possible quantum states for the
system, each of which is associated with a macroscopi-
cally different environment, and occurs with a probabil-
ity which is given by the calculation. There are several
ways to look at these alternative possibilities:
(A) one may postulate that after the measurement the
system is “projected” onto one possibility only, corre-
sponding to the observed environment (usual “reduction
of the wave packet” postulate)
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(B) one may assume that all possibilities keep on going,
but that there are continuous “branching” of universes,
so that we can see one branch only, i.e. the one where
we live (“many-worlds” interpretation)
(C) one may assume that the alternative possibilities
describe a statistical ensemble of identically prepared sys-
tems. In accordance with the usual statistical approach,
there is some “missing information” about the state of
the system, corresponding to the fact that the density
matrix of the system alone is a statistical mixture. This
information is supposed to be written in the environment.
We list below some difficulties associated with these
different points of views, then we draw a conclusion.
(i) The point of view (A) has the problem of “termi-
nating” the unitary evolution of the state (according to
Schroedinger’s equation) by an “extra” non-unitary pro-
cess (a projection). The question is then how to relate
these two radically different types of evolution.
(ii) The point of view (B) does not explain why only
one result is observed in any given experiment: in (A),
the uniqueness of the result is postulated, in (B) all pos-
sible results are still there, and in (C) this question is
ignored and considered to be irrelevant. The usual an-
swer in (B), which says that only the branch “where I
am” actually matters, is very puzzling, because the exis-
tence of other branches “where I am not” looks more as
an artifact than a description of the physical world.
(iii) In the point of view (C), that we believe to be the
most widely accepted at present, the existence of a miss-
ing information written in the environment is postulated
rather than demonstrated. Actually, it can be argued
that the choice of one (and only one) measurement re-
sult “must happen” at some point; then (C) seems to
require an implicit use of either point of view (A) or (B).
More generally, all that can be done by the decoherence
point of view is to create a “growing quantum state” as
more and more sub-systems are coupled to the initial
system S1. As far as we can see, this cannot warrant
that a classical- looking environment will be recovered
at the end. On the other hand, one must remember our
initial argument that the environment was actually a pre-
requisite for the definition of the quantum state.
We are thus lead to our main conclusion, which is sim-
ply that the uniqueness of the measurement’s re-
sult is guaranteed by the uniqueness of the en-
vironment, which is actually, as it was said from
the beginning, a necessary condition for the very
definition of the quantum state.
Comment 1 : This may hurt the intuitive feeling that
the measurement should either “reveal” a pre-existing
state of S1 (naive “classical” view), or “drive” S1 from an
initial to a final state, including the environment (naive
“quantum” view). Actually, for quantities which are not
in the initial CSCO, there is in general no pre-existing
quantum state (i.e. well-defined properties) of S1, to be
revealed at the end of the measurement. On the other
hand, S1 is not “driven” somewhere: according to the
QM formalism, S1 has become intricated with the en-
tire environment, and it is only as a consequence of the
procedure which allows one to define a quantum state,
that such a state is eventually observed. The “contex-
tual” essence of QM lies in the compatibility between
the “downstream” definition of a quantum state, and the
“upstream” evolution given by the decoherence calcula-
tion.
Comment 2 : In our approach, the boundary be-
tween quantum and classical mechanics results
from the fact that the quantum state is defined
in terms of the observed environment, and thus
cannot include this environment. If the evolution of
the system leads to an “entanglement with the environ-
ment”, then the global state becomes irrelevant (because
the corresponding fully predictable observables are out
of reach), and the system’s state is no longer defined. It
appears then that the system is in a statistical mixture
of states, where the “missing information” can be read
out in the environment. The decoherence approach al-
lows one to calculate the corresponding diagonal density
matrix, but it is unable to “terminate” the calculation,
by extracting only one result. The “interpretative” step
that is required at this point is more than a matter of con-
venience related to the fact that the global state is too
complicated to be followed. Our claim is that this in-
terpretative step is required from the beginning, because
it is precisely the one which is required in order to de-
fine the quantum state (see section II). In practice, our
conclusion agrees quite well with the point of view (C)
introduced above, which is now built inside our very def-
inition of the quantum state, and does not require an
implicit use of either (A) or (B).
Comment 3 : A well known question is then: how to
separate the “system” from the “environment” ? Actu-
ally, defining the environment is not ambiguous, since
it is the point from which the quantum state is defined
(i.e. the classical world where we are). The definition of
the system is more subtle, and it depends on the precise
physical system which is studied. The existence of this
(very flexible) boundary, far from being a weakness of
QM, is actually a strength. In particular, this opens the
way to “mesoscopic quantum states”, which are one of
the main challenges of today’s quantum mechanics.
Comment 4 : Our view is consistent with the idea that
QM is a non- deterministic theory. Though the evolution
of the quantum state is deterministic, non-determinism is
due to the fact that in general (i.e. each time a non-CSCO
observable is measured) the measurement redefines the
state, taking into account the contextual nature of the
theory. Similarly, our approach does not change anything
to quantum non-separability: a quantum state is gener-
ally non-separable, and may violate Bell’s inequalities.
Despite our initial use of the EPR wording, our point of
view thus differs from EPR on two central issues:
(i) not all physical quantities are fully predictable, only
a subset of them (Heisenberg’s inequalities)
(ii) the quantum state has an objective reality, but it
is non-separable (Bell’s inequalities).
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Non-separability is probably the most original feature
of quantum mechanics, and directly contradicts “local
realism”, which is the view expressed mathematically in
the hypothesis leading to Bell’s inequalities. On the other
hand, there is no contradiction with relativistic causal-
ity, and not even with “naive” realism, according to our
definition of the quantum state.
Comment 5 : Do we add anything new with respect to
the “reduction of the wave packet postulate” ? Again, the
difference is that this postulate is no longer necessary, but
is built inside our definition of the quantum state: from
the beginning, a quantum state is (objectively!) defined
with respect to observations which are made within the
environment. It is just a consequence of this definition
that new observations in a changing environment lead to
a new - but again uniquely defined - quantum state.
Comment 6 : Clearly our very definition of a quan-
tum state relies on something external to it, as was often
advocated by Bohr. However, we do not accept to infer
that a quantum state is merely “subjective knowledge”.
We consider that our definition of the quantum state is
objective, in a sense that has been discussed above. In
our view, a quantum state gives the best possible objective
description of a suitably isolated subsystem of the physi-
cal world (what is a suitable isolation is defined by QM as
being “decoherence-free”). On the other hand, we note
that our point of view makes it very difficult to speak
about anything like a “quantum state of the universe”.
Comment 7 : Most interpretations of QM, including
the present one, agree on the fact that the quantum struc-
ture of the microscopic world explains the features of the
classical structure of the macroscopic world. But another
question is in which sense it is possible to “construct” or
“deduce” classical physics from quantum physics. There
are at least two answers to this question. The first one
is simply to say that the purpose of QM is to calcu-
late correlation functions between successive measure-
ment events. This is a very “minimalistic” approach from
a conceptual point of view, but it is extremely useful both
for teaching and for using QM. Our approach is fully
compatible with this “correlation function” approach: in
some sense, we are only trying to put words around it,
in a way as consistent as possible. Another answer is
to say that the classical world can be explicitly deduced
from QM by using e.g. coarse graining and decoherent
histories. However, this point of view leads also to the
idea of the “wave function of the universe”, including an
infinite infinity of branches corresponding to all possible
results of all possible “measurements”. We are clearly
very doubtful about these approaches, precisely because
the formulation of QM is contextual, that is, depends at
its start from what it should “explain” at its end, i.e.,
the observed environment. As said above, our “contex-
tual objectivity” point of view is that QM is the best
possible objective description of a “suitably isolated” (or
“decoherence-free”) subsystem. This is already a lot in
terms of predictive power, but if carried out of this realm,
QM does turn into a “smoky dragon”, which tries in vain
to capture its origin.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the general goal to provide a “status report”
rather than any final argument, we have presented an at-
tempt to reconcile the still prevailing Copenhagian point
of view about QM, with the more modern “decoherence”
points of view. A brief summary of the main our main
statements is presented here :
(1) Measurements allow one to define the quantum
state of a physical system in an objective and observer-
independant way (the new point here is that we apply
this “classical” statement to QM as well).
(2) Given a quantum state, only a subset of all physical
quantities is fully predictable (on the other hand, given
a classical state, all physical quantities can be known;
denying this possibility does not impede our objective
definition of the quantum state).
(3) A quantum state may be non-separable : the phys-
ical properties of a sub-system are then among the non-
predictable ones, even though the state of the whole sys-
tem is perfecty defined (on the other hand, the classical
state of a compound system can always be defined by
cutting it in parts, and defining the state of each part;
again, denying this possibility does not impede our ob-
jective definition of the quantum state).
(4) If one measures a physical property which is not
among the predictable ones, the initial system becomes a
(non predictable) sub-system in the measurement appa-
ratus, and the state is reset by looking at the measure-
ment result (this brings back to step one).
Our approach differs from the orthodox Copenhagian
approach, by insisting upon the objective character of
the quantum state. It also differs from the standard de-
coherence approaches, by insisting upon the fact that the
boundary between classical and quantum mechanics can-
not be “erased”, since a quantum state “involving the
environment” cannot be consistently defined.
Both aspects are contained in the definition of a quan-
tum state from the values of a set of physical quantities
which can be predicted with certainty and measured re-
peatedly without perturbing in any way a system.
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